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"The Doom of Slavery": Ulysses S. Grant, War Aims, and Emancipation, 1861-1863 Brooks D. Simpson Like many Northerners, Ulysses S. Grant went to war in 1861 to save the Union—and nothing more—in what he predicted would be a short conflict. By 1863, after two years of bloody struggle against a stubborn enemy, Grant came to understand that a war to preserve the Union must of necessity transform that Union. Central to that revolutionary transformation was the acceptance of emancipation as a war aim and the enrollment of ex-slaves in the bluecoat ranks. The intensity of Confederate resistance compelled Union commanders to accept this notion, while the influx of black refugees into Yankee camps helped to force a decision. In 1861 Grant believed that the Union should keep hands off slavery if a quick peace and rapid reconciliation was desired. By 1863 circumstances had changed. Notions of a limited conflict gave way to the concept of a total war waged against Southern resources and morale as well as manpower. New means were needed to attain victory. To save the Union one must destroy slavery. Grant's experiences as a field commander are illustrative of this process, suggesting the interaction between the progress of the war effort, the escalation of Southern resistance, and the transformation of war aims to encompass emancipation. From war's beginning Grant realized that at the core of the dispute was the institution of slavery. His position on the peculiar institution was ambiguous, and he left no detailed explanation of his feelings for historians to examine. Marriage to the daughter of a slaveholder entangled him in slavery: he worked alongside slaves, his wife owned four house servants, and he was a slaveholder for a short period. Yet family slaves heard him speak out against the institution, he did not succumb to the The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by a research grant from Wofford College. He thanks Richard H. Sewell and Allan G. Bogue for their advice and counsel and John Y. Simon and David L. Wilson for their encouragement. Civil War History, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, ° 1990 by the Kent State University Press "the doom of slavery"37 blatant prejudices of his age, and he freed the slave he owned at a time when the money a sale might have brought could have been a great boon. He showed no interest in protecting slavery, let alone perpetuating it.1 Moreover, Grant understood that the advent of war in the spring of 1861 would affect slavery, no matter the outcome. Southerners were risking the foundation of their society even as they defended it. "In all this I can but see the doom of Slavery," he told his father-in-law. "The North do not want, nor will they want, to interfere with the institution. But they will refuse for all time to give it protection unless the South shall return soon to their allegiance." The disruption of the Southern economy by war would render it vulnerable to international competition, reducing the worth of slaves "so much that they will never be worth fighting over again." Slavery would be destroyed as a consequence of prolonged conflict, a casualty of events rather than the target of Union policy.2 Nevertheless, a quick Northern victory, achieved before hatred could become deep-seated, might minimize the impact of the conflict upon slavery. And Grant believed that such a rapid triumph was possible. Startled by the vigorous reaction of Northerners in Sumter's aftermath, he ventured that if Southerners ever discovered what they had wrought, "they would lay down their arms at once in humble submission." Confidently he predicted a Northern triumph in a conflict "of short duration." With "a few decisive victories" by the North the "howling" Confederates would flee the field. "All the states will then be loyal for a generation to come, negroes will depreciate so rapidly in value that no body will want to own them and their masters will be the loudest in their declamations against the institutions in a political and economic view." If slavery was to suffer, it would be as a byproduct of the conflict, not because of deliberate...
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