On the nature of revenue-sharing contracts to incentivize spectrum-sharing

Abstract

In a limited form cellular providers have long shared spectrum in the form of roaming agreements. The primary motivation for this has been to extend the coverage of a wireless carrier's network into regions where it has no infrastructure. As devices and infrastructure become more agile, such sharing could be done on a much faster time-scale and have advantages even when two providers both have coverage in a given area, e.g., by enabling one provider to acquire “overflow” capacity from another provider during periods of high demand. This may provide carriers with an attractive means to better meet their rapidly increasing bandwidth demands. On the other hand, the presence of such a sharing agreement could encourage providers to underinvest in their networks, resulting in poorer performance. We adapt the newsvendor model from the operations management literature to model such a situation and to gain insight into these trade-offs. In particular, we analyze the structure of revenue-sharing contracts that incentivize both capacity sharing and increased access for end-users.

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