Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity

Jan Eeckhout Y

91 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Review

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Abstract

Just like perfect (frictionless) matching models, a search model is proposed that is characterized by bilateral search and vertical heterogeneity. It allows for a generally specified utility function. The equilibrium allocation is unique and exists in iterated strict dominance. The model is robust with the perfect matching model as frictions disappear. Nonetheless, the equilibrium allocations are surprisingly odd. For multiplicatively separable preferences, the distributions are partitioned endogenously. And for a wide range of preferences, matching sets are naturally disconnected.

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References

1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage 1973A Theory of Marriage: Part I 1997Marriage and Class 1984Dominance solvability and cournot stability 1990The job search problem as an employer–candidate game

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2017Assortative matching and search with labor supply and home production 2010Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption

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