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Contracting with spatial externalities and agency problems The case of retail leases
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References

  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach13,984 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1986Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device4,694 cited
  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1986Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market1,000 cited
  • 1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization870 cited
  • 1962Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market700 cited
  • 1992Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market562 cited
  • 1985Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion262 cited
  • 1993Inter-store externalities and space allocation in shopping centers147 cited
  • 1988Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market.144 cited
  • 1983Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation122 cited
  • 1990Retail Leasing: The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents109 cited
  • 1987Chapter 19 Therories of urban business location

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