Model Discourse: Interpretative Repertoires in Scientists' Conference Talk

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the organization of psychologists' discourse concerning scientific models. It examines accounts where both advocates and critics of `top-down' and `bottom-up' theoretical models defend their own conceptions and criticize other psychologists' conceptions. The findings of this analysis (1) illustrate the way in which psychologists use interpretative repertoires to produce internally coherent - but at the same time highly variable - accounts of action and belief; (2) explain the detailed content and organization of accounts in terms of dual motivations both to maintain a coherent position and to avoid making a potentially disruptive blaming; (3) represent a development of the work done on error accounting in biochemistry, the focus of interest in the present study being switched to social scientists and the use of interactional, rather than interview, data. Overall, the analysis describes some features of the constitution of scientific conferences and shows the potential for integrating discourse and conversation analytic approaches.

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