Quantitative Limits to Qualitative Engagements: GIS, Its Critics, and the Philosophical Divide∗

Abstract

Heated exchanges between critical theorists and GIScientists over geographic information systems (GIS) in 1990s geography gave rise to calls for increased communication between critics and practitioners of the technology and most recently for “hybrid” qualitative–quantitative GIS practices. Although GIS scholars have successfully addressed mid-1990s critiques of the technology by developing a series of critical GIS practices that involve nuanced and reflexive deployments of GIS and assessments of its visual products, theoretical critiques of GIS remain fixated on the epistemological deficiencies of the technology. Despite references to loosening metaphysical tensions across the discipline, this difference in assessments reveals the discourses of critical-theoretic geography and GIScience to remain separated by a trenchant philosophical divide, across which ontological and epistemological commitments are inviolable. The inability to fully reconcile a critical–theoretic epistemology with the explicitly ontological metaphysics of GIS further complicates qualitative engagements with the technology by addressing a series of inconsistencies into GIS praxis arising from the quantitative limits to representation encountered in the formal universe of computing. The persistence of metaphysical tensions in critical engagements with the technology questions the degree to which qualitative methods can be seamlessly hybridized with the quantitative architectures of GIS.

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