More on Aristotelian Epagoge

Abstract

During the last two decades there has been growing interest in Aristotle's doctrine and use of dialectical, non-demonstrative forms of argument. One of the results is that his concept of epagoge or induction has received renewed attention in scholarly literature. I am thinking of the monograph by Kurt v. Fritz from 19641 and two articles in Phronesis, one by Walter Hess (1970)2 and one fairly recent by D. W. Hamlyn (1976)3. Much may be learnt from reading these works, as well as what has proved a natural starting-point for modern research into the topic, viz. Ross' discussions in his A ristotle4 and his edition of the A nalytics5. In this paper I wish to add only one substantial point that concerns the interpretation of Prior Analytics II 23 (section III). The remaining sections serve mainly to establish the proper context for that point, section I by considering the various senses of epagoge and the corresponding verb epagein in Aristotle, section II by trying to find the proper place for nous or reason in connection with epagoge, and section IV by glancing rapidly at the notorious final chapter of the Posterior A nalytics. In much of what I say in these sections I am particularly indebted in one way or another to Hamlyn's paper, but do not in general mark where I follow or reject his interpretations.

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