Costly Search and Recruiting

Peter W. Howitt · R. Preston McAfee

120 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Review

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Economic theories and models Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

A labor market model with costly search and recruiting is constructed. It incorporates many features found in other models and provides new insights into the effects of externalities and transaction costs. The model possesses a continuum of equilibria, some of which may be Pareto-ranked, with different rates of unemployment. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, comparative-statics results are obtained. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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2000Pareto-improving Immigration in an Economy with Equilibrium Unemployment 2015Aggregate Demand, Idle Time, and Unemployment *1991Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem 2006Scale Effects in Markets with Search 2014ENDOGENOUS JOB CONTACT NETWORKS 1994Cross-Sectional Efficiency and Labour Hoarding in a Matching Model of Unemployment 1989The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search Equilibrium

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