Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanationJames Woodward2010-02-05articleBiology & Philosophy474 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Philosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy, Science, and HistoryBayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 474 citations exist upstream.References2004Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation2008The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene1994Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation2000Causation as InfluenceCited by2010Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions2007Causation with Human Face2011Is meta-analysis the platinum standard of evidence?2013Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation2014Genetics and philosophy: an introduction2015The problem of variable choice2015Measuring Causal Specificity2017Models Don’t Decompose That Way: A Holistic View of Idealized Models