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Learning to agree
3 references·7 citing·27 second hop
Learning to agree (1983)Learning to agreeWe can't disagree forever (1982)We can't disagree foreverAn Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge (1981)An Axiomatic Characterization…Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeThe positive foundation of the common prior assumption (2005)The positive foundation of th…The complexity of agreement (2005)The complexity of agreementHow to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information (1999)How to make sense of the comm…Agreeing to Disagree: A Survey (1997)Agreeing to Disagree: A SurveyProtocols Forcing Consensus (1996)Protocols Forcing ConsensusChapter 40 Common knowledge (1994)Chapter 40 Common knowledgeOn the logic of “agreeing to disagree” type results (1990)On the logic of “agreeing to …Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989)Convention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge (2004)Knowledge and belief (1962)Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games (2003)Does one Bayesian make a difference? (2014)The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge” (1992)Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade (1996)Mutual Optimism and War (2007)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Combinatorial Information Market Design (2003)LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION (2012)Game Theory (2013)Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption (2002)Finite Order Implications of Common Priors (2003)RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2006)Don't Bet on It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information (1983)Toward an interdisciplinary theory of coordination (1991)Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1982We can't disagree forever394 cited
  • 1981An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge187 cited

Cited by

  • 1990On the logic of “agreeing to disagree” type results78 cited
  • 1999How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information64 cited
  • 1994Chapter 40 Common knowledge46 cited
  • 1996Protocols Forcing Consensus38 cited
  • 2005The complexity of agreement37 cited
  • 2005The positive foundation of the common prior assumption34 cited
  • 1997Agreeing to Disagree: A Survey34 cited

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