Normative and Recognitional Concepts

Abstract

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I oughr to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do. ” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenu-ity. I have in mind here an “all things considered ” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do Let’s experiment, then, with accepting this suggestion. It commits us to something of theoretical import. The answer to an ought question is a state-ment; I can state this: I ought to speak loudly enough in public that people can hear. If I settle what to do, though, I voice my conclusion not with a statement, but with something like an imperative: “Speak audibly, ” I might

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