Co‐Cognition and Off‐Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach

Abstract

It is generally assumed that the debate between theory‐theory and simulation theory is an empirical one, but this view of the structure of the debate is misleading. It is an a priori truth that theory‐theory is mistaken and equally a priori that simulation in one sense (here labelled ‘co‐cognition’) is central in thinking about the thoughts of others. Given this, it is a further question how our co‐cognitive powers are realized in sub‐personal machinery. Here simulation in quite another sense (that involving such ideas as ‘pretend states’ and ‘off‐line’ mental processes) may provide one possible answer.

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