Article2007

Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting

228 citations0/0 files storedTerrorism and Political Violence

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Political Conflict and Governance Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence Military History and Strategy

Abstract

In many armed conflicts, rebel groups deliberately target civilians. This article examines whether such violence is related to the performance of the rebels on the battlefield. It is proposed that rebel groups who are losing battles target civilians in order to impose extra costs on the government. When rebels attack civilians, the government may incur both political and military costs. Violence against civilians is thus used as an alternative conflict strategy aimed at pressuring the government into concessions. The argument is evaluated by using monthly data for rebel groups involved in armed conflict from January 2002 to December 2004.

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Cited by

2012Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts 2014Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War 2014Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians 2018Organized violence, 1989–2017 2013Terrorism in the Context of Civil War 2009Poverty and Civil War Events 2017A Strategic Logic of Attacking Aid Workers: Evidence from Violence in Afghanistan 2019Talking to the Shameless?: Sexual Violence and Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts

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