Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects

Keith E. Stanovich · Richard F. West

229 citations0/0 files storedThinking & Reasoning

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

Abstract

Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle—that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 229 citations exist upstream.

References

1979Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk 1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1974Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1975Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1981The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice 1982Judgment under Uncertainty 1984Choices, values, and frames.1984Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.

Cited by

2002Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability 2005The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis 2002Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives 2006Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing 2002Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice 2005Automatic–Heuristic and Executive–Analytic Processing during Reasoning: Chronometric and Dual-Task Considerations

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.