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A Theory of Fed Watching in a Macroeconomic Policy Game

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
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1976RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF COSTLY INFORMATION39 cited
1988Central bank secrecy, ‘fed watching’, and the predictability of interest rates28 cited

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2004Transparency and the Strategic Use of Private Information in Monetary Policy14 cited

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