Are perks purely managerial excess?Raghuram G. Rajan, Julie M. Wulf2005-08-12articleJournal of Financial Economics305 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Corporate Finance and GovernanceAuditing, Earnings Management, GovernanceAccounting and Organizational ManagementAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 305 citations exist upstream.References1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices1980Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation1976Social Limits to Growth2019The theory of the leisure class: an economic study of institutions2011The theory of the leisure class; an economic study of institutionsCited by2020CSR disclosure and firm performance: The mediating role of corporate reputation and moderating role of CEO integrity2006Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?2010Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market2006Institutional Ownership Stability and the Cost of Debt2006Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?2009Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements2008The Choice of Corporate Liquidity and Corporate Governance2011IPOs versus Acquisitions and the Valuation Premium Puzzle: A Theory of Exit Choice by Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists