RESPONSIBILITY AND RATIONAL ABILITIES: DEFENDING AN ASYMMETRICAL VIEW*

Dana Kay Nelkin

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, I defend a view according to which one is responsible for one's actions to the extent that one has the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. The view is asymmetrical in requiring the ability to do otherwise when one acts badly or for bad reasons, but no such ability in cases in which one acts well for good ones. Despite its intuitive appeal, the view's asymmetry makes it a target of both of the main camps in the debate over responsibility. In addressing objections, I explore the relationship between fairness and responsibility, and the nature of the ability to do otherwise.

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References

1996Two Faces of Responsibility 1975Free Agency 1988Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 1998Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases

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2021Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions 2021Fair Opportunity and Responsibility 2022Praise 2012Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom 2017Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom 2015Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency

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