The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization

Christopher Harris · Philip J. Reny · Arthur John Robson

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

Christopher Harris, Philip Reny, Arthur Robson, The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization, Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 3 (May, 1995), pp. 507-544

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References

1986The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory 1985Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology 19641. Some Topics in Two-Person Games 1955Note on non-cooperative convex game 1986An Approach to Communication Equilibria 1979Controlled Stochastic Processes 1990Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules 1994Stationary Markov Equilibria

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