On Repeated Games with Complete Information

Sylvain Sorin

123 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 123 citations exist upstream.

References

2015Games and Decisions 1953Stochastic Games 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 1985Finitely Repeated Games 1981Survey of Repeated Games 1976The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games 1971The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides

Cited by

1991On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 2003Computing Supergame Equilibria 2010A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control 1987Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games 1989Game Theory 1999Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known 1998Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata 1987Game Theory

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.