Social Constructionism as Ontology

Abstract

This paper contends that anti-realist claims regarding the `nature' of social constructionism and the world it describes are erroneous. Specifically, we argue that claims regarding the impossibility of referentiality and objectivity-often seen as defining characteristics of constructionism-mistake both the nature of the subject matter at hand and the consequences that follow from theoretical critiques of naive objectivism and realism. Drawing upon the (critical) realist philosophy of science, we illustrate, through the use of a particular case study, that the version of constructionism proposed here is more compelling, credible and has greater utility than others that have been offered.

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