No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
In the first three sections, I argue that Hobbes has a distinctive conception of philosophy, the highest value of which is not truth, but human benefit; and that his philosophical utterances are constrained by this value (both insofar as they are philosophical in particular, and insofar as they are public utterances of any kind). I address an evidentiary problem for this view in the penultimate section, and then turn to the question of how such a conception of philosophy requires different interpretations of particular philosophical positions. The whole is intended as a case study of the need for an interpreter to understand how the interpreted philosopher conceives of the nature and aim of his undertaking.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 53 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.