Pragmatism,Instrumental Value Theory and Social Economics

Abstract

Since the summer of 1970, when the membership of the Catholic Economic Association voted to change its name to the Association for Social Economics and accepted a revised version of its aims and objec? tives, the association has grown not only in membership but also in heterogeneity. It seems to have been easier to agree on what is wrong with positivistic, mainstream economics than to define a normative conception of economic science that would command sufficient adher? ence by most of its members, and so give the association greater coher? ence, strength, and unity. Over the last half dozen years, a small but vocal and articulate group of members has been trying to fill this gap by rallying around the instrumental ethics of John Dewey and Clarence Ayres.1 It is the purpose of this paper to examine the desirability of reconstructing social eco? nomics along an outline provided by this pragmatic outlook. In the process, we have to expose the reader to some of the more significant and relevant aspects in the historical evolution of pragmatism; a devel? opment characterized by an increasingly strong emphasis on naturalism and atheism which culminated in the writings of Clarence Ayres. Our critical survey will conclude that such a naturalistic ethics does not provide the kind of common ground that social economists have been looking for.

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