Aesthetic Deception: On Encounters with the Past

Abstract

In 1998 archeologists conducting a site inspection for the development of the harborfront of the city of Buffalo discovered the remnants of the original terminus of the Erie Canal.1 This structure, known as Commercial Slip, once opened a shipping channel into the Buffalo River and thence to Lake Erie and points west. After a hundred years of use it had been buried and built over, and by the late twentieth century the old harbor was overshadowed by elevated highways and empty grain elevators. The redevelopment project was designed to revive the area with recreation and tourist attractions, including the reproduction of a portion of the historic canal district. When the original canal terminus was discovered, plans continued to build a nearby replica. The old site was to be reburied; perhaps its outline would be marked on the pavement above to indicate its presence underground. But the historic “feel” of old Buffalo—the “experience” of the nineteenth‐century canal town—was to be evoked by a reproduction slip, by an area of newly laid cobblestone streets, and by interpretive centers and signage, all of which presented fewer engineering and financial complications. To the apparent consternation of officials in charge of the project, this plan met vigorous resistence from the vocal majority of citizens, who might have been presumed to have no interest in what was now little more than a hole in the ground. There were heated public debates, newspaper articles, courtroom hearings, injunctions, and demonstrations. Under pressure, the state development plan was revised, and it was decided to uncover, restore, and rewater the old Commercial Slip, retaining not only its site but also the original limestone walls that had been christened with a splash from a bucket by Governor Dewitt Clinton in 1825 when the canal was opened. This may seem an odd anecdote to introduce a subject in aesthetics, for engineering feat though it may have been, no one has claimed that the canal terminus represents a thing of beauty; nor except in the most extended sense can it be considered a work of art. But I have chosen this example in the hope that by selecting an object with only one important aesthetic feature, I can show that this feature is presumed by other objects whose more obvious aesthetic merits overshadow it. What the uncovered site possesses is the property of being the real western terminus of the Erie Canal. Because of this, it has claims on attention that a replica would not, even though a replica might be more like the original site in its entirety. The planners of the replica project also presumed that it would have greater aesthetic appeal. In this surmise they were wrong; I hope here to explore why. ‘Authentic,’‘original,’‘real,’ and ‘genuine’ are related but not synonymous terms, and apposite usage depends on object and context. I use both ‘genuine’ and ‘authentic’ to conduct this study. Invoking any of these concepts invites an array of familiar puzzles: metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical—as well as aesthetic. What counts as genuine or authentic for an object that inevitably changes over time, for example, especially one that has been damaged and restored? By what means do we recognize genuineness? What exactly do such terms modify, and what kinds of value do they invoke? What does the ontological state of an object matter if it delivers a full and enjoyable experience? While not inseparable, these questions are sufficiently connected that answers to one have consequences for the others. Despite the daunting problems presented by the concept itself, I intend to defend genuineness as an aesthetic property, an aesthetic value, and a feature of experience. I shall not engage general debates over the ontology of aesthetic properties, a term I use to refer to aesthetically salient properties—those that contribute to an object's aesthetic value, no matter how they are understood.2 I shall argue that ‘genuine’ names a presumptive property of objects that legitimately affects experience whether or not it is perceptually discernible. Other aesthetic properties depend on it, and—even more important for my focus—it can itself be the direct intentional focus of an aesthetic encounter. I shall not, however, presume that terms like ‘genuine’ are synonyms for ‘best’ such that a genuine object is ipso facto aesthetically better than a replica or an adaptation, although I do think that genuineness commands respect even if it does not guarantee other aesthetic virtues.3 A locution I use frequently, ‘aesthetic encounter,’ indicates that I endorse an old theoretical usage connoting a type of apprehension or grasp of an object.4 This approach emphasizes cognitive engagement, which includes the more commonly invoked notion of “experience” but stresses the singular insight gained therefrom. The traditional way to describe this brand of apprehension is to note that it requires first hand, direct acquaintance and that it delivers a kind of affective illumination. While the general requirement of direct acquaintance is sometimes questioned, it is indispensable for the kinds of cases that will concern me here.5 Aesthetic encounters are apprehensions of their objects, and one can be mistaken about those objects, for the moment of experience is not self‐validating. Hence the possibility, and sometimes the gravity, of aesthetic deception. Genuineness may seem hard to defend as an aesthetically important property (though not as an artistic or a historical property) because it is not reliably discernible from perceptual encounters. Scientific measurements, historical research, trusted authority, and so forth are needed to substantiate identification and provenance before genuineness can be insured, for perception and affective response alone may furnish few to no clues to the matter. There is a school of thought, sometimes dubbed “aesthetic empiricism,” that would locate all aesthetic properties within the set of those that are manifest in experience.6 Manifest properties include sensory properties: how something looks or sounds, and, if one countenances the bodily senses (as I do), how it feels or smells or tastes. Imagination and cultural competence inform manifest properties, although they also complicate the task of separating perceptually discernible qualities from those that require additional information. Probably fewer theorists, when pressed, hold strong aesthetic empiricism than at first appears.7 But considering its implications not only musters a case against the empiricist stress on manifest properties, it also reveals weaknesses in other approaches to aesthetic salience that would locate aesthetic value only in experience.8 In what follows, I shall join the (fairly large) camp that opposes aesthetic empiricism, and, more generally, aesthetic “experientialism,” adding to the arguments for that opposition some observations about modes of sense experience that are relatively seldom considered: taste and touch. Emphasis on these proximal senses will narrow my scope, for measures of genuineness vary considerably by both type and purpose of object. While some of the topics I consider are relevant for practical decisions about restoration and preservation, these are not my focus. Nor are the new and perplexing questions about authenticity presented by digital storage of images and texts.9 The performance arts present still other concerns, variant for music, dance, and theater—large subjects I shall also skirt. Indeed, the standard arts will play only a minor role in this discussion. I am interested in genuineness as it pertains to objects with tangible presence—loosely speaking, material objects. Why mingle ideas about taste and touch in an exploration of genuineness? These senses have less history in aesthetic discourse, and I am interested in probing aspects of their operation that might have been slighted or overlooked. The objects of these two senses provide stark and and and of taste are the to in terms of and it is to their aesthetic value in the they In objects of touch may be and it is to presume that the genuine object is the one that These are both and This will with a set of including historical of and this I do not of the as to from of are in that their value is and all are for aesthetic But one can that provide even the majority of aesthetic cases that the concept of the aesthetic is a artistic in to which other of the term are Aesthetic encounters are as they are as are into of both the salience of will also that ‘genuine’ can experience any experience is one would think it would be the of the of and is commonly that taste and but with few taste also requires experience. it in the for also taste with one of its because the of manifest in and is more considered a in even of taste is by identification of the This is obvious in and in because of an in what we as a taste that into other sensory modes as well but is with tastes. are both as the of a and as of a The of a familiar is the taste of The of is the taste of but it is the taste of the this is a case of aesthetic the into it is But if one is interested only in is to be a and its are the a property and a property of a is no of manifest so a as a on the presumptive properties of their objects, even when at first it they were to a for one that delivers the taste of now that a a of the of on the of the and the of But the is new and a of from and that the has its in a of The is now in an might experience and that something was with the which of or might endorse the or This is the of example of the and the on a for than the of a being by to an object of the objects of taste to one the taste of and the taste of one might and both would be genuine encounters. has the as the of the might be the There has been but it has been in the of that a two is perceptually at in the But it not that it is also aesthetically that would presume that the and object of experience is the is not only the experience of a but also the of a traditional or the of a of the has to do with the or The is of the taste are aesthetically only if we have decided that aesthetic salience within experience and has no or What is the would not be in experience. all sensory can be and identification to be into focus. that or whether one is or that a of whether one is or a that was In cases such as identification of the affects whether the taste is and or This is not a of about of a but the focus of a into a one that the taste of a as the that a work of to the aesthetic properties it, as has so the of affects both taste qualities and their for is it is The may be with but not with identification is not but when it we are the of genuineness and its aesthetic The the concept of the taste of the by the that a is a concept to the of for affects the of The most can the of of a (though this may be more in than in In this perceptual the includes and in some cases and even what is or The of the is presumed in all of those and at the two can as aesthetic an authentic for example, would for the to an of from a but the was a the of its old and about it. a is like the taste of a that has its and to with only thing to do is to that it is and it a the of the into the that would the and no sense of this and two senses of that may be aesthetically the kind of object and the object. the objects of taste are and require only that they be the type of object. from the will present the qualities and the though in such as the may because they are so A might still that the of sensory properties not with the that one has been mistaken about the of their my on taste has not been consider that aesthetic encounters are only in terms of they are with and with some about the of their objects more their a to this feature of and the an aesthetic the case of a and the was to only when by all of the perceptually discernible properties of may that with was with an with but was to the deception. matter how the the object of was mistaken and was as in because is one of the whose objects are not even with that the manifest is not that the experience would authenticity is a property presumed in the in for that experience to have about in the first is an aesthetic and sometimes an aesthetic deception. aesthetic or with can be a as is the use of for those to the of of what is sometimes the “aesthetic are less by deception. as manifest properties, they are aesthetically it may seem as if they the the of is an aesthetic of the What properties of an object are salient for the of aesthetically such that they are within the aesthetic The is if one first what are to as aesthetic properties and the The and and genuineness is the that may be in or of the on other in those is the role of sense in an object. is one that the sense of touch. When the of the in they what of the it to of After the the city was to as it had and the an the now of a within a of that was with the of and to the way it the There is an important sense in which one does the old city of from those who like their aesthetic encounters to include to the it is a experience. the tourist against a of the old a with as against have might in be against what was once of the city of to the for of that were in the of There is a strong sense in which old and no sense in which what does it is though presented as (though not of in attention is to a the of the are not in the aesthetic though they might be in But the of the historical of this that is the for being the in the of old in the aesthetic Hence the for it is the property in the and is a of aesthetic deception. is the case in of the that are that the city was This example some in the direct acquaintance that is the traditional of aesthetic encounters and perhaps its may be of on its object. an whose and are in the aesthetic presence is Because touch is not in and to the objects on the operation of this sense is more obvious such as historic or even one the of and in my This does not of a but is a way of attention to the from any of its manifest sensory touch a sense of being in with The to touch is when objects for their and historical one to the Buffalo when it that the Erie would would be so for me if I and touch the walls of the Commercial in the presence of the object is presumed by aesthetic such as The can both its properties and its value that one has been mistaken or about the as of the of the and value of that experience. is the salient aesthetic of such as old and the Erie and it is by a by the of the about and from the that two of historical value and work of is also a historical because it represents a in the development of and, as the no real can be for While both to value is to be in objects that the of and that show the of their historical value to objects as they a of cultural value is the more familiar and no one that and have historical value, would historical from aesthetic This is not a to for and other have as being a are also aesthetically But it is not to argue that their historical value is still from the aesthetic value by those To the that historical value is connected to and and the of of the and to the that it such into it may the aesthetic In value is from the and affective that an object has on the value itself perception and to I would about perception with for the is even more by to this proximal which the of being in with the value to cultural such as and and to objects such as and sensory properties, being is not both a and a an it is the it requires this I had better an Why be an aesthetic property and value be as an aesthetic it not better considered as a feature for perhaps only no aesthetic of the on such as have been most in the the because they have been for so Why a interest with aesthetic While may not the aesthetic are when it one with something that has over or before remnants of the This is a direct and acquaintance with strong affective as standard of aesthetic encounters and it delivers a grasp of the object of I do not to aesthetic experience into a but I do that this kind of experience is and as of in aesthetic or even the experience is the property of the intentional object. The is familiar from related has been with to even the most be for the artistic that it of aesthetic properties, such as or that the object so is the genuine one at the historical in the of cultural and But genuineness is more than a for a set of aesthetic and artistic it is itself a direct and object of aesthetic a to an of historical and In the are by a of its and to that into of the on the the What The is as as its aesthetic the But first of the of the is now because it presumed to the is that is a genuine this one but it is not This is the response to of the for example, which feature only objects in their but on the at their the objects but over the identification to the old from the This is more with objects with few to no of interest on the aesthetic for the genuine before is of aesthetic value by its requires objects for their are also those that are most to have had their original by or This reveals that the of do not a value and value may into for value does not the of objects that in interest in historical value is more in attention to historical concerns, which require the manifest properties that value are value may be at with the of the aesthetic and for A and an object's but the presence of new or the affective of its the other hand, if an has so that it is it has the it can be even for its value and this with value and, its can a of an object from the no in its original may be of the original or While the affects its value, historical value might be and value is not it might be are might be both old and new it might be in or it might be even to and the aesthetic qualities of the original or for if are to be the more and more properties of the object properties of what the object to value is in at the first value in this restore, it not for in the is to real a of though to the real thing the genuine object. To have value an object has to be old is not But how old is old is restored? of the original of an be in for value to There are no to to for and these are not to be it is important to that as one the qualities to the aesthetic those relevant to value experience to an intentional object so from what we presume it to be an for aesthetic deception. will not have that my interest in these some even including presence and which are sometimes considered not only but also to a of my also on the of and an I shall not authenticity and value concerns, this the that at this historical and the of that objects are the of to the we with What would perhaps not have in the such as presence time, now because of the it with what is to be Hence a is a of as But are greater to than of genuineness itself is a or even to that value would contribute to aesthetic deception. I now consider two including presumptive qualities such as genuineness in the of aesthetic encounters the of aesthetic salience into that are to and other for example, the that were at one to but were to be by was to be that their value would with the new because are in greater but is it not that these were to manifest a be with for the of the including or is a for the kind of presumptive property that the of aesthetic properties to their objects. can be from is a and I have a standard for by on the aesthetic salience of what an But if it is to and the only on the of the is not that aesthetically have been considered they were In perhaps might into focus properties that were to the also to the this is an of might have of from aesthetic qualities to to and sense than to of The with genuineness is that perhaps the standard it is both and to are both than in the of if we focus on of and than we are still with that are to What is are not but with changes in and with others. I was to with a with the that I would experience the genuine of When I about its I was that one of the was wit

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