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Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game
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Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game (2002)Coordination, Communication, and Common K…Global Games: Theory and Applications (2010)Global Games: Theory and Appl…Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study (2007)Equilibrium selection through…Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (2004)Unique Equilibrium in a Model…Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk (2002)Co-ordination, Spillovers, an…Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (1997)Approximate Common Knowledge …p-Dominance and Belief Potential (1995)p-Dominance and Belief Potent…Global Games and Equilibrium Selection (1993)Global Games and Equilibrium …The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge” (1992)The electronic mail game: Str…Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure (1990)Tacit coordination games, str…Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Rationalizability, Learning, …“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties (1990)“Evolutionary” selection dyna…Puzzles: The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener (1989)Puzzles: The Other Person's E…Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989)Approximating common knowledg…A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988)A General Theory of Equilibri…We can't disagree forever (1982)We can't disagree foreverAgreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeConvention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Communication and Coordination in Social Networks (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Bubbles and Crashes (2003)The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (2012)Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers (1973)Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization (1990)Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies (1994)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)Definite reference and mutual knowledge (1981)Elements of discourse understanding . Edited by Aravind K. Joshi, Bonnie L. Webber, and Ivan A. Sag. Cambridge: University Press, 1981. Pp. ix, 341. $32.50. (1983)Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change* (2013)A Simple Model of Herd Behavior (1992)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs (2005)The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships (2013)Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible (1992)The Grammar of Society (2005)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after All? (2004)Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows (2010)Investor flows and fragility in corporate bond funds (2017)Combinatorial Information Market Design (2003)LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION (2012)Game Theory (2013)The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003)When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007)Silent disco: dancing in synchrony leads to elevated pain thresholds and social closeness (2016)
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References

  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1988A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games2,089 cited
  • 1990Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities1,810 cited
  • 1993Global Games and Equilibrium Selection1,547 cited
  • 2010Global Games: Theory and Applications929 cited
  • 1990Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure808 cited
  • 2004Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks782 cited
  • 1992The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”523 cited
  • 1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs459 cited
  • 1982We can't disagree forever394 cited
  • 1990“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties272 cited
  • 1995p-Dominance and Belief Potential226 cited
  • 2007Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study98 cited
  • 2002Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk98 cited
  • 1989Puzzles: The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener75 cited
  • 1997

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Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
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