Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment

Adib Bagh · Alejandro Jofré

63 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.

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References

1982Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society 2001Efficient Rent Seeking 1999On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games 1994Modelling rent-seeking contests 2015Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games

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2008An existence result for discontinuous games 2010On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games 2009Essential equilibria in normal-form games 2015On the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games 2017Equilibria with discontinuous preferences: New fixed point theorems 2020Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games 2015Existence of Nash equilibrium in ordinal games with discontinuous preferences 2010Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games

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