Articlegreen2010

Hutcheson’s Deceptive Hedonism

19 citations0/0 files storedJournal of the history of philosophy

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Classical Philosophy and Thought Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Abstract

Francis Hutcheson’s theory of value is often characterized as a precursor to the qualitative hedonism of John Stuart Mill. In this paper, I seek to argue that this reading is mistaken. The evidence for Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist is strong and striking. The most commonly cited passages are taken from his posthumous opus, A System of Moral Philosophy . However, a closer look at Hutcheson’s moral psychology, including his account of the interplay between pleasure and the moral and evaluative senses, shows that we do no disservice by reading him as a purely quantitative hedonist. Hutcheson’s hedonism is for that reason deceptive, and deceptively simple.

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1739A Treatise of Human Nature 2018An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 2003An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections: With Illustrations on the Moral Sense 2014A System of Moral Philosophy 2001Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times 1902Francis Hutcheson: his Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of Philosophy.1992Mill's deliberative utilitarianism 2008Religion in Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy

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