We Do, Therefore We Think: Time, Motility, and Consciousness

Abstract

This article is a philosopher's expanded review of two recent books on neurophysiology: Rodolfo Llinás's I of the Vortex and György Buszáki's Rhythms of the Brain. Researchers such as these are converging on a view of consciousness as originating in motility and as inherently temporal due to the brainwave oscillations that underlay it. Most current discussions of consciousness include implicit philosophical presuppositions inherited from the canon of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, e.g. that consciousness is self-reflective, passive, and timeless. Because of this, Llinás's and Buszáki's insights may not be fully appreciated. Western philosophy, however, also includes what might be described as a counter-tradition--and one that is more compatible with empirical biological science than the usual canon. Heraclitus, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and especially the 20th century French philosopher and psychologist, Merleau-Ponty, all anticipated aspects of Llinás's and Buszáki's approaches. Their alternative conceptual vocabularies are useful for strengthening Llinás's and Buszáki's approaches, sketching out a notion of consciousness emerging from motility, and generating new hypotheses for neurophysiological research.

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