Article1981

On the Alleged Backwards Referral of Experiences and Its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem

125 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy and History of Science Free Will and Agency

Abstract

A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely.

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References

1977The Self and Its Brain 1978Cerebral correlates of conscious experience 1978The Integrated Mind 1979SUBJECTIVE REFERRAL OF THE TIMING FOR A CONSCIOUS SENSORY EXPERIENCE 1971Subliminal Perception: The nature of a controversy 1965Cortical Activation in Conscious and Unconscious Experience 1967Brain and conscious experience 1969Systems theory and biology

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2015Disfluency in Swedish human–human and human–machine travel booking dialogues 2002Physical, Neural, and Mental Timing 2012How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will 1990Consciousness and time 1992Begging the question against phenomenal consciousness 1992Time and consciousness 2006Consciousness, Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics: The Case for a Connection

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