Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care

2000-09-01articleAmerican Economic Review219 citationsclosed

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Healthcare Policy and Management Healthcare Systems and Reforms Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care by Jacob Glazer and Thomas G. McGuire. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 1055-1071 of American Economic Review, September 2000

Citations in this library

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References

2019American Economic Review

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1998Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection

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2015How Much Favorable Selection Is Left in Medicare Advantage?

2006Predictability and predictiveness in health care spending

2017Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets

2011Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency

2014The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care: An International Perspective