Executive Power and Public Policy in the States

Abstract

T HE PURPOSE of the research reported below was to explore the linkage between some major structural characteristics of state government and the content of public policies in the states. Specifically, the focus is upon the policy consequences of (1) the organizational structure of state executives, and (2) the formal powers of governors. What are the policy consequences of a fragmented state executive with many separately elected officials and independent boards, in contrast to a more streamlined executive organization? Does it make any difference in educational outcomes whether the chief educational officer in the state is elected, appointed by an independent board, or appointed by the governor? Are welfare benefits noticeably more liberal in states with an appointed welfare director in contrast to an independent welfare board? Does it make any difference whether the highway department is headed by an appointee of the governor or an independent board? What are the policy consequences of providing the governor with strong budgetary, appointive, and veto powers? Are there any significant differences in the public policies of states with strong and weak governors? Or are public policies primarily a function of the economic environment of a state its wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and educational level? In assessing the impact of structural variables on public policies in the fifty states, we will inquire: (1) whether states with fragmented executive structures and weak governors pursue significantly different policies than states with streamlined executive structures and strong governors, and (2) whether any policy differences which are observed can be traced to these structural variables rather

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