Infallibilism and Human Kinds

Francesco Guala

23 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of the Social Sciences

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science Critical Realism in Sociology

Abstract

Infallibilism and apriorism are still influential in the philosophy of social science. Infallibilists about human kinds claim that there are features of institutional entities about which we cannot possibly be wrong. But infallibilism is not implied by the theory of collective intentionality that supposedly grounds it. Moreover, it fails to account for the mode of existence of important institutional kinds, including the paradigmatic example of money.

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2018ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL REALITY 2010The meaning of ‘meaning’1970Convention: A Philosophical Study.1970Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination 1996The Construction of Social Reality.1970CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 2007Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities 1991Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds

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