Two models of truth

Abstract

Ten years ago vagueness, or more generally imprecision, was an oddity. Finally we have appreciated that it is a difficult, important topic. One reason is that imprecision makes for difficulties with applying the concept of truth. In so far as imprecision is ubiquitous, so are these problems. But many still think that we can and do sometimes have complete precision. I say this is a mirage, and it’s important to see how the illusion arises. This illusion arises simply because ordinarily we ignore imprecision. Maps provide an analogy: no map is perfectly precise. But for the maps we trust we ignore their imprecision and just use them. For language we do the same, but language has an additional social component. It’s a familiar idea that in conversations there is a ‘common ground’ of ‘presuppositions’, that is statements that all agree are, or at least can be, treated as true. This is a very general phenomenon, for example, also occurring in the Kuhnian idea of a disciplinary matrix. Equally, in conversations, we agree about where we can ignore imprecision, perhaps as a default mode.

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