An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse

Sheryl B. Ball · Max H. Bazerman · John S. Carroll

151 citations0/0 files storedOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Conflict Management and Negotiation Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Recent research on bilateral bargaining behavior under uncertainty has found that, under asymmetric information, negotiators develop inferior bidding strategies because they fail to incorporate valuable information about the decisions of their opponents. This results in negative profits, or the “winner's curse.” The present study provided subjects multiple opportunities for feedback as well as experience in both negotiation roles. Neither learning opportunity eliminates the winner's curse.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 151 citations exist upstream.

References

1979Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk 1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1974Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism 1975Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1960The Problem of Social Cost 1977Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.1980Toward a positive theory of consumer choice

Cited by

1990The influence of experience on negotiation performance 1992Negotiator cognition and rationality: A behavioral decision theory perspective 1998Negotiator Risk: Sources of Uncertainty and the Impact of Reference Points on Negotiated Agreements 2006Chapter 12 Online Auctions 1998Game Theory, Experience, Rationality 2003Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.