Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationingStephen D. Williamson1986-09-01articleJournal of Monetary Economics775 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Economic theories and modelsMonetary Policy and Economic ImpactBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 775 citations exist upstream.References1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring1977INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION1977Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation1980On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification1985Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem1986Financial intermediary-coalitionsCited by2013Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific1993Resolving the scale efficiency puzzle in banking2008Banks and innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms☆2000Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking2012Misallocation and productivity2016Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa1996Market Microstructure and Intermediation2003Financial Intermediation