There Are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED

Jerry A. Fodor

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Categorization, perception, and language

Abstract

For example, RED is a recognitional concept iff it numbers, among its constitutive possession conditions, the ability to recognize at least some red things as red. In this paper, I propose to argue -indeed, I propose to sort of provethat there are no recognitional concepts; not even RED. Lots of philosophers are sympathetic to the claim that there are recognitional concepts. For one thing, insofar as recognitional capacities are construed as perceptual capacities, the claim that there

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1995Prototype theory and compositionality

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