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Cohabitation or forced marriage? A study of the costs of failing to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies
2 references·7 citing·32 second hop
Cohabitation or forced marriage? A study of the costs of failing to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies (1990)Cohabitation or forced marriage? A study …Fiscal and monetary policy co‐ordination: A differential game approach (1989)Fiscal and monetary policy co…International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model. (1988)International Macroeconomic P…What causes business cycles to elongate, or recessions to intensify? (2018)What causes business cycles t…Volatility Transfers between Cycles: A Theory of Why the 'Great Moderation' Was More Mirage than Moderation (2014)Volatility Transfers between …A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations (2009)A Macroeconomic Policy Game f…Time Consistency, Subgame Perfectness, Solution Concepts and Information Patterns in Dynamic Models of Stabilization Policies (2008)Time Consistency, Subgame Per…Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics (2000)Who Wants an Independent Cent…On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games (1998)On the open-loop Nash equilib…Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance (1996)Central Bank Independence and…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory (1982)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Conflict and cooperation in a model of stabilization policies (1987)The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)Central Bank Independence (1996)Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy (2011)Games and Decisions (2015)Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy (1977)Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom in Monetary Policy? The surprising fragility of the theoretical foundations of inflation targeting and central bank independence * ** (2006)Rethinking Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Independence (2006)The Banking Sector, Government Bonds, and Financial Intermediation: The Case of Emerging Market Countries (2010)The Endogenity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria (1998)Differential Games in Economics and Management Science (2000)“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game (2011)Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy (1967)A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence (1976)Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive? (1985)Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World (1989)On Macroeconomic Policy Co‐ordination in EMU (2002)Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements (2006)Nonzero-sum differential games (1969)Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices (1987)The (in)finite horizon open‐loop Nash LQ game:An application to EMU (1999)Feedback Nash equilibria in the scalar infinite horizon LQ-game (2000)Linear–Quadratic Mean-Field-Type Games: A Direct Method (2018)Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why? (2002)An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area (2003)The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988 (1991)The Determinants of Consumer Installment Credit (1993)Business Cycles: Real Facts and a Monetary Myth (1990)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model.189 cited
  • 1989Fiscal and monetary policy co‐ordination: A differential game approach46 cited

Cited by

  • 1998On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games81 cited
  • 2018What causes business cycles to elongate, or recessions to intensify?20 cited
  • 2008Time Consistency, Subgame Perfectness, Solution Concepts and Information Patterns in Dynamic Models of Stabilization Policies19 cited
  • 2000Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics18 cited
  • 1996Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance16 cited
  • 2009A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations12 cited
  • 2014Volatility Transfers between Cycles: A Theory of Why the 'Great Moderation' Was More Mirage than Moderation12 cited

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