References

• 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government5,197 cited
• 1970Exit, Voice, and Loyalty3,618 cited
• 2000The effect of IMF programs on economic growth604 cited
• 2002Competition as a discovery procedure532 cited
• 1982Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients467 cited
• 1996The World Bank: Its First Half Century300 cited
• 1991The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality243 cited
• 2003Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data212 cited
• 1988Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic194 cited
• 2003The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom159 cited
• 2007Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis126 cited
• 2019The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A Public Choice Analysis108 cited
• 2002Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs in developing countries103 cited
• 2004A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality102 cited
• 1999The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat?88 cited