Article1996

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARKET FOR FAVORS AND VOTES IN CONGRESS

59 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Political Influence and Corporate Strategies Electoral Systems and Political Participation Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

This paper examines the strategies that “horse traders” and “power brokers” adopt in trading favors to pass legislation. Although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe, the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading. With data from the Senate vote on the Byrd Amendment to the 1990 Clean Air Act I conduct such a test. The test provides evidence that on this vote (i) favor trading occurred, (ii) the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination, and (iii) the coalition leaders did not collude with each another.

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1975Congress, The Electoral Connection 1960The Calculus of Consent 1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.1990Corporate culture and economic theory 1989Bargaining in Legislatures 1963The Theory of Political Coalitions.1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets 1990A Course in Microeconomic Theory

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