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On optimal sharing rules in discrete-and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility

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2011On the first-order approach in principal–agent models with hidden borrowing and lending33 cited
2010Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups31 cited
2008Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options22 cited
2021Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

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