The role of competition and knowledge in the Ellsberg task

Abstract

Abstract Ambiguity avoidance denotes people's preference for gambling situations with known over unknown, or ambiguous, probability distributions. In four experiments we provide evidence for the interaction between competitiveness and knowledge in Ellsberg's task, in which people have a choice between a risky box (distribution of balls known) and an ambiguous box (distribution of balls not known). If the situation is perceived as competitive (the experimenter or an opponent is responsible for composing the boxes) people avoid ambiguity by betting on the box with the known probability distribution. If the task is perceived as cooperative (a partner or friend is composing the boxes) people are indifferent toward ambiguity or even ambiguity seeking. In addition, we find that people expect their winning odds to be less than even in the ambiguous box. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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