References

• 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
• 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
• 1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model2,212 cited
• 1956The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation1,734 cited
• 1992Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility595 cited
• 1993Designing institutions for monetary stability573 cited
• 1996How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy457 cited
• 1984Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information440 cited
• 1995Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence408 cited
• 1987RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES401 cited
• 1996What Does the Bundesbank Target?382 cited
• 1997Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics—and Vice Versa381 cited
• 1997Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts281 cited
• 1998Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers259 cited
• 1994How independent should a central bank be219 cited