Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard

2 references·7 citing·38 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1983Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets549 cited
1990Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships484 cited

Cited by

2001Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem110 cited
2000LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS66 cited
1994Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts63 cited
2012REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*59 cited
2001Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Monotonicity57 cited
2008Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model31 cited
2004On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation29 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work