This Body Which is Not One: The Body, Femininity and Disability

Abstract

In the social system in which we live, the imaginary body is an able body. The able-bodied has established its representations that are the projection of able-bodied subjectivities. In this article, I shall develop a psychoanalytic account of physical disability in order to open up possibilities for physical disability beyond its position as castrated able-bodiedness. Psychoanalysis, to me, is not simply about `sexuality' but can also be used to analyse `physical disability', indeed all aspects of one's subjectivity. I shall propose the appropriation of psychoanalysis to explain the construction of subjectivity, whether it is able-bodied or disabled, in a way that parallels the male/female dichotomy. Within an able-bodied symbolic, in which the able-bodied takes itself as normal, it is impossible to illustrate the multiplicity of the disabled. Following Irigaray's claim that the ambiguity of female sexuality does not conform to male notions of sexuality, I argue that the complexity of the disabled body does not fit into the able-bodied norm of subjectivity. In this article, I shall be drawing on Irigaray's theory of embodied subjectivity to argue against the masculine-able-bodied-based theory of subjectivity found in Freud and Lacan.

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