Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology

Abstract

Simone de Beauvoir has written of the sense of excitement that marked Jean-Paul Sartre's first encounter with the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. Perhaps no work of Sartre's communicates this excitement, and the reason for it, quite so transparently as his brief 1939 essay on Husserl's notion of intentionality. Husserl here appears as a revolutionary, almost as a saviour, who has provided the necessary key for putting philosophy back in touch with the ordinary experience which both French realism and French idealism had vainly sought to characterize. Realism and idealism alike had been guilty in effect of a reduplication of things in consciousness, dependence on an often unexpressed correspondence theory which made mental surrogates for the real the only reality available to man. But if the present essay testifies to Sartre's attempt to return French thought to immediate contact with things, it enters into a fascinating dialectical tension with another of Sartre's chief motives—to purify immediate experience of its deceptions through a highly reflective, analytic mediation. The essay first appeared in Nouvelle Revue Francaise, LII, January 1939. (Tr.)

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