Assessing Competition in The Market for Corporate Control: Australian Evidence

Philip R. Brown · Andrew Horin

13 citations0/0 files storedAustralian Journal of Management

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Merger and Competition Analysis Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

Ruback (1983) proposed a novel test of competition in the market for corporate control. He argued the market would be competitive if, in the context of two or more bidders, it did not pay an unsuccessful offeror to lift his bid to the successful offeror's price. Ruback's evidence was consistent with the American corporate acquisitions market being competitive, in this sense. We use Australian data to replicate Ruback's test. Our results mirror Ruback's, in that 58 out of 72 takeovers were consistent with a competitive Australian market. The 14 inconsistencies could have been due to bidder collusion, strategic behaviour, legal impediments, or quite possibly, confounding events.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 13 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 1965The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]1983The market for corporate control 1983The gains to bidding firms from merger 1983Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.