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Opportunity cost of capital forbearance during the final years of the FSLIC mess
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References

  • 1988Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking1,782 cited
  • 1981Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital525 cited
  • 1991The Losses Realized in Bank Failures416 cited
  • 1990The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen?363 cited
  • 1990The S & L insurance mess: how did it happen?294 cited
  • 1991The great savings and loan debacle213 cited
  • 1993The S. & L. Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation.192 cited
  • 1991The S & L debacle: public policy lessons for bank and thrift regulation138 cited
  • 1990Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs124 cited
  • 1987DANGERS OF CAPITAL FORBEARANCE: THE CASE OF THE FSLIC AND “ZOMBIE” S&Ls123 cited
  • 1989Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance119 cited
  • 1989Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators114 cited
  • 1993Firm Efficiency and the Regulatory Closure of S&Ls: An Empirical Investigation70 cited
  • 1995U.S. Office Market Values During the Past Decade: How Distorted Have Appraisals Been?57 cited
  • 1987The Use of Market Information in Pricing Deposit Insurance50 cited

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  • 1993When are thrift institutions closed? an agency-theoretic model46 cited
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