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Is there just one possible world? Contingency vs the bootstrap · Study

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ArticleIs there just one possible world? Contingency vs the bootstrap

James T. Cushing1985

Article1985

Is there just one possible world? Contingency vs the bootstrap

James T. Cushing

18 citations·0/0 files stored·Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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Philosophy and History of Science Particle physics theoretical and experimental studies Philosophy, Science, and History

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References

1982The Scientific Image.1968The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.1981The Manufacture of Knowledge 1963The Great Chain of Being 1982The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy 1981Science and Hypothesis 1941Philosophy of Physical Science 1984The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy

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1989The justification and selection of scientific theories 1992On the Evolution of Natural Laws 2018Structural realism, mathematics, and ontology

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Year1985

Typearticle

Published1985-03-01

VenueStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

ISSN-L0039-3681

Languageen

Citations18

Files0 public / 0

ShelfPhilosophy and History of Science

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doi10.1016/0039-3681(85)90006-8

openalex_workW2089657456

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