Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework

Jeremy I. Bulow · Kenneth Rogoff

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Global Financial Crisis and Policies International Development and Aid Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

This book, edited by Jacob A. Frenkel, Michael P. Dooley, and Peter Wickham, presents a sample of the work of the IMF and that of world-renowned scholars on the analytical issues surrounding the explosion of countries with debt-servicing difficulties and describes debt initiatives and debt-reduction techniques that hold the best promise for finding a lasting solution to the problems of debtor countries.

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References

1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model 1986A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt 1986Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction 1986The pure theory of country risk 1973Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation

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1990Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts 2015Country Solidarity in Sovereign Crises 1993Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements 1995Chapter 39 Sovereign debt 2002Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns 2002First World Governments and Third World Debt 2019Revisiting the Economic Case for Fiscal Union in the Euro Area 2013The wonder-clause

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