In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation

Peter A. Graham

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral obligations.

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References

1991Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection 2002The Right and the Good 1980Utilitarianism and Co-operation 1996The Concept of Moral Obligation 1986Oughts, Options, and Actualism 1986Doing the Best We Can 2008Living with Uncertainty

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