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A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health

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Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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Andrew D. Foster, Mark R. Rosenzweig, A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 76, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 213-227

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1996THE RETURNS TO ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL IN PAKISTAN'S RURAL WAGE LABOUR MARKET 2002Health, nutrition and prosperity: a microeconomic perspective.2012A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”2001Development Economics 2005Development Economics 1997The dynamics of agricultural production and the calorie-income relationship: Evidence from Pakistan 1996An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance 2011Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry

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